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Abstract: In this study we tried to explore the idea of the independence of internal audit 
committee, independence of finance and accounting departments and the corporate charter 
followed by the board of directors of an organization and how they protect existing and 
prospective investors. A multiple regression analysis and analysis of covariance (ancova) 2X2 
have been used to analyze the data by using the R i386 2.1 5.1. A strong and positive relation has 
been found in this study with a highly correlated in ependent variable. It has been also found that 
62% of the investors believed that internal auditors and finance and accounting executives are not 
independent at their work place. Surprisingly 89% felt that if internal audit committee and 
executives of finance and accounting departments work independently and effectively, then 
investors will be highly protected. 
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INTRODUCTION 
ccording to the definition of internal audit provided by the Institute of Internal Audit (IIA) in 2011 that “an 
independent, objective assurance and consulting activity is designed to add value and improve an 
organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the eff ctiveness of risk management, control and governance 
processes”. The internal audit function should be given the appropriate status in the organization to enable the 
function to exercise organizational independence and individual internal auditors to act objectively. This is 
necessary because internal auditors are in a unique position as employees of an organization with respon ibility to 
assess and monitor decisions made by the management and also to advise the management on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of internal controls (Sarens & Beelde, 2006). Mercer (2004: 190) notes that internal auditors ‘serve as 
the first line of defense against disclosure errors, ferreting out unintentional errors caused by weakn sses in a 
company’s internal controls and intentional errors due to fraud.’ The internal auditing profession in general, and 
internal audit activities more  specifically, have changed significantly over the past decade, mainly driven by 
evolutions in corporate governance (Ramamoorti, 2003).  
Individual investors will use an internal audit reporting (IAR) when evaluating a company and that such a report will 
increase perceived oversight effectiveness and confidence in financial reporting reliability (Wilson &Walsh, 1996; 
Case, 2006). Protecting investors rights include those to receive dividends on pro-rata terms, to votefor directors, to 
participate in shareholders' meetings, to subscribe to new issues of securities on the same terms as the insiders, to 
sue directors or the majority for suspected expropriation, to call extraordinary shareholders' meetings, etc. Investors 
are entitled to know information about the company they own. And it is only with that information that they can 
effectively engage with these companies. If they don’t have this information, they really are in the dark. The 
Institute of Chartered Accountant in England and Wales (ICA) strongly suggested the public interest in audit in the 
Audit Forum in 2005. Whilst internal auditors carrying out a statutory audit of financial statements are ccountable 
and report to the investors of a company only, there may be other prospective stakeholders who believe that an 
independent internal audit provides some means of ensuring that the company’s responsibilities to them are being 
met; in effect that it serves their interests too. 
 
A
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The audit committee is considered to be an important self-regulatory governance mechanism with significant 
oversight responsibilities over financial reporting, internal control and audit activities (Blue Ribbon Committee 
(BRC), 1999; United States (US) Congress, 2002). There is also an expectation among these other stakeholders that 
auditors should be independent of shareholders. Furthermore, according to corporate governance guidelines the audit 
committee has oversight responsibility for areas asociated with preparing reliable financial statements and this 
includes the internal audit function. Therefore, the need for increased transparency about company governance, 
management, the audit committee, the external auditor, and the internal audit department are cornerstone  of 
governance that are essential to managing organizational risks (Bailey et al., 2003; Gramling et al., 2004).  
The New York Stock Exchange now requires all listed companies to maintain an internal audit function (SEC, 
2003). While the NASDAQ has stopped short of requiring member companies to maintain an internal audit f nction, 
it does recognize the establishment of this governance mechanism as a best practice (Harrington, 2004). 
Furthermore, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2004) stated that for large or complex companies, 
the absence of an effective internal audit function should be regarded as a significant deficiency in internal controls 
over financial reporting and possibly a material weakness. One of the reports of PWC in 2012 outlined that business 
trends expected to have the most impact on internal audit roles, responsibilities, and functions between 2007 and 
2012 are technology, new regulations, risk management, corporate governance, and ethics and compliance 
The main objective of this study is to determine whether and how the internal auditor, finance and accounting 
department and board of directors can protect the inv stment of individual investors who are planning to invest in a 
particular company. We also tried to determine the rol  of internal auditors in corporate governance and how 
corporate governance facilitate the internal auditors t  prepare the error free financial report so that prospective 
investors get the real scenario of the company before making the investment decisions. The study was motivated 
after reading the “Ibrahim Khaled Share Market Probe Committee” report on the share market scam in Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) in 2010.  
The capital market of Bangladesh is passing through a period of extreme volatility, uncertainty and grave crisis. 
Following the bursting of the bubble in December 2010, the market has lost values in terms of all major indicators. 
For example, as of 31 December 2011, DSE General Index (DGEN) dropped by 41 per cent; market capitalization 
went down by 29 per cent; and total trade value of the DSE suffered erosion to the tune of 83 per centfrom the peak 
on 12 December 2010, when DGEN attained 8918 points. The P/E ratio which rose to as high as 29.7 in November 
2010 had come down to 13.68. A committee was formed by the Government of Bangladesh and it was headed by 
Dr. Ibrahim Khaled. In his report he mentioned five main reasons that triggered the collapse of DSE and one of the 
reasons was manipulation of financial statements by internal auditors. The scam victimized almost 3 million small 
shareholders who lost their investment and still they are struggling to recover their principal amount. Moazzem and 
Rahman (2012) brilliantly summarized the “Probe Report” in their paper.  They investigated the reliability and 
authenticity of audit reports of the listed companies n DSE. The submitted audit reports did not reflect the actual 
financial situation of the company, and appeared to be prepared with an intention to manipulate the market behavior 
(e.g. issuance of a large number of right shares by several companies in 2010. They figured out that only 19 per cent 
of the total listed companies were audited by firms that had official affiliation with international audit firms and 
about 60 per cent of listed companies were audited by firms which were enlisted with the NGO Affairs Bureau or 
Bangladesh Bank. Surprisingly, more than one‐fifth of the listed companies were audited by firms which had no 
affiliation other than the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB).   
BACKGROUND STUDIES 
Objectives, Independence and Effectiveness of the Internal Auditor  
Over the past decade or so, companies have tended to operate with increasingly sophisticated technology, growth in 
e-commerce transactions, more variations in management control systems, more human resource turnover, and 
ongoing changes to corporate and professional rulesand regulations. Such underlying change and complexity in the 
organization’s operating environment can make it increasingly difficult for internal auditors to conduct their audit 
tasks or apply professional standards with sufficient clarity. Faced with ambiguity, internal auditors would have less 
certainty about whether the information gathered in the course of their examinations is sufficiently objective and 
relevant (Ahmad and Taylor, 2009) 
Institute of Internal Audit (IIA) defines the term Objectivity as “an unbiased mental attitude that allows internal 
auditors to perform engagements in such a manner that they have an honest belief in their work product and that no 
significant quality compromises are made. Objectivity requires internal auditors not to subordinate their judgment on 
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audit matters to that of others.” Independence has been defined as having ‘no relationship to the corporation that 
may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the corporation’ (BRC, 1999). 
Independence is not an aspect of internal auditing hat can be mechanically exercised. Since professional 
pronouncements on auditor independence, such as ISPPIA (2006), tend to be principles-based more than rules-
based, the exercise of independence will be cognitive in nature. It will rely on the internal auditor’s personal attitude 
and commitment towards the exercise of independence in arrying out tasks and making judgments at work. IIA has 
also published a framework to guide internal auditors with respect to independence and objectivity. In this 
framework, independence is recognized as a state whre threats to objectivity are appropriately managed. 
Independence, based on the criterion of objectivity, is pivotal to the internal auditing profession and i ternal auditors 
(Mutchler, 2003).   
Hence, internal auditors are required to identify, access and manage threats to their objectivity, including the need to 
consider safeguards that can mitigate the effects of the threats. Several empirical studies that have explored the 
association between audit committee independence and financial reporting outcomes indicate that firms with more 
independent members display better financial reporting quality. For example, Beasley et al. (2000) found that 
companies committing financial statement fraud have less independent committees than the industry benchmarks. 
Likewise, Abbott et al. (2003), based on 78 matched pairs of fraud and no fraud companies, found that no-fraud 
companies tend to have more independent audit committees than fraud companies. Independent directors are not 
economically dependent on the company, and thus are arguably less biased over an entity’s financial outc mes 
(Beasley et al., 2000). 
Internal audit function should be given the appropriate status in the organization to enable the functio  to exercise 
organizational independence and individual internal auditors to act objectively. This is necessary because internal 
auditors are in a unique position as employees of an organization with responsibility to assess and monitor decisions 
made by management and also to advise management on the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls (Sarens 
and Beelde, 2006). 
Goodwin and Yeo (2001) surveyed chief internal auditors in Singapore and found that audit committee’s comprised 
solely of independent directors had more frequent meetings and more private meetings with the chief internal 
auditor. Goodwin (2003) obtained similar results in a survey of chief internal auditors from Australia and New 
Zealand. In contrast, however, (O’Leary & Stewart 2007), in a study of Australian internal auditors’ ethical decision 
making, found that the existence of an effective audit committee had little impact on internal auditors’ perceptions 
of their willingness to act objectively. 
Internal auditors should not be placed in a position where their independence can be questioned and feel unable to 
make objective professional judgments (Vanasco, 1994). Ideally, internal auditors must be free to report matters 
they audit as they are and their reporting activities are not subject to any influences (Sawyer & Dittenhofer, 1996). 
The ISPPIA (ISPPIA; IIA, 2006) has identified internal auditor’s independ nce as the most important criterion for 
effectiveness of the internal audit function. In general, shareholder and stakeholders perceive internal auditors as 
being entrusted in making independent assessments, judgments and decisions (Mutchler, 2003). 
Effectiveness is the achievement of goals and objectives using the factors measures provided for determining such 
achievements. However, it has been traditional in internal auditing that the determination of internal auditing 
effectiveness can be accomplished by evaluating the quality of internal auditing procedures (Dittenhofer, 1997). The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and board responsibility for the effectiveness of internal control further raise this issue 
(D’Silva & Ridley, 2007). For internal auditing to be effective, it requires a high standard in work performance 
(Smith, 2003). The effectiveness of internal auditing relies on an adequately staffed internal audit department 
(Mitchell & Sikka, 2005). 
H1: Existing and prospective investors will have more confidence and feel secure if internal auditors of the
companies understand their objectives and work independently than internal auditors of the companies’ who don’t.  
Internal Auditors Relation with External Auditors  
The frequent use of internal audit report by client firms leads to the possibility that external auditors will 
increasingly rely on internal audit in conducting their audits (Ward & Robertson, 1980). External auditors are 
responsible for verifying that the financial statements are fairly stated in conformity with GAAP and that these 
statements reflect the ‘true’ economic condition and operating results of the entity. Thus, the external auditor’s 
verification adds credibility to the company’s financial statements. Also, the external auditors are requi ed by 
auditing standards to discuss and communicate with the audit committee about the quality, not just the acceptability, 
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of accounting principles applied by the client company. Therefore, a quality audit is expected to constrain 
opportunistic earnings management as well as to reduce information risk that the financial reports contai  such as; 
material misstatements or omissions. The internal audit function is part of an organization’s internal control system 
and thus the external auditors will seek an understanding of the function as part of their overall audit planning 
process (ISA 610; SAS 65; AUS 604, Zain et al. 2006).  
While the roles of internal and external audit are distinct, there are many opportunities for coordination and 
cooperation between these two functions that may yield synergistic outcomes, such as higher quality audits and 
economic benefits. In fact, professional auditing standards acknowledge the potential contribution that an IA 
function can provide to the external audit (SAS No. 65, AICPA, 1991; ISA No. 610, MIA, 2000; PCAOB, 2007). 
This contribution can be made by internal auditors either working as assistants under the direct supervision of 
external auditors or independently performing various audits and reviewing work throughout the audit year on which 
the external auditors may rely (SAS No. 65, AICPA, 1991; Maletta, 1993).  
However, a key factor in the consideration of the us of internal audit in the external audit process is the quality of 
internal audit. Both professional auditing standards and prior studies (see SAS No. 65, AICPA, 1991; ISA No. 610, 
MIA, 2000; Felix et al. 2001; IIA 2009; Prawitt, Smith & Wood, 2009) suggest internal audit quality encompasses 
specific attributes of the organization and parties p rforming internal audit activities (e.g., competency of internal 
audit staff) and external auditors are to first consider the quality of internal audit function in terms of objectivity, 
competence and work performed by the internal audit f nction before relying on the work of the internal auditor. 
Previous research suggests that a positive relation exists between external auditors’ reliance on internal audit work 
and the strength of the internal audit function (Khalik et al., 1983; Brody et al., 1998; Maletta, 1993; Schneider, 
1985). The findings of (Krishnamoorthy, 2002) indicate that the greater the objectivity, technical competence and 
quality of work performance (i.e. the exercise of due professional care), the larger the potential for internal auditors 
to contribute to the external audit. The contribution that internal auditors make towards assisting external auditors in 
the financial statement audit process has gained renew d attention (Elliot & Korpi, 1978; Felix et al., 2001; Wallace, 
1984). 
The current governance environment has led to an increased emphasis on the relationship between internal and 
external auditors (Gramling et al., 2004). The economic benefits of external auditors’ reliance on inter al audit work 
are well recognized (Glover et al., 2008). They also predict that external auditors rely more on work performed by 
outsourced internal auditors than by in-house internal auditors because the latter are closely aligned with 
management. However, James (2003) argued that in-house internal auditors are likely to be more accessible than 
those from an outside provider as outsourced audit teams have limited contact with the company. 
H2: Existing and prospective investors will have more confidence and feel secured if the companies’ internal a d 
external auditors are truly cooperative while auditing the financial statement than the companies’ internal and 
external auditors are not.   
Internal Audit as a Part of Corporate Governance 
A good corporate governance structure helps ensure that the management properly utilizes the enterprise’s resources 
in the best interest of absentee owners, and fairly reports the financial condition and operating performance of the 
enterprise. [Audit Quality, Corporate Governance, and Earnings Management: A Meta-Analysis]. According to 
corporate governance guidelines such as the Auditing and Assurance Standard Board of the Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation (2002) and the MCCG (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 2000), the audit 
committee has oversight responsibility for areas asociated with preparing reliable financial statements and this 
includes the internal audit function. As Hold (2009) said, from a research perspective of the corporate governance 
and governance transparency literatures provided evidence that information about the internal audit function affects 
investor confidence and decision-making. From policy and practice perspectives, the study’s findings complement 
calls in the contemporaneous accounting and governance literature for companies and regulators to consider the 
potential for an internal audit report (IAR) to extrnal stakeholders to improve governance transparency.  
Internal auditors play an important role in their organization's corporate governance, internal control s ucture, risk 
management analysis, and financial reporting process. Internal audit resources also have been expanded to satisfy 
the high demand for services to assist in executive certifications of internal controls and financial reports (Rezaee, 
2010). Prior research provides consistent evidence of a positive relation between corporate governance and financial 
reporting quality (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 1999, 2000; Klein, 2002; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; 
Krishnan, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; Wang, 2006). Recent studies in internal auditing have evaluated extensively the 
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role of internal auditing in corporate governance. Cooper et al. (2006); Hass et al. (2006); and Allegrini et al. (2006) 
reviewed details of recent studies on internal auditing in the United States, Europe, Australia and Asia.  
It has become clear that, mainly driven by the increased attention for ‘good governance’ and the resulting 
regulations and guidelines (for example, the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US, but also various corporate governance 
codes in Europe), internal auditing has established its position within the corporate governance field (Paape et al., 
2003; Gramling et al., 2004; Leung et al., 2004). More specifically, the internal auditor rle in monitoring and 
improving risk management and internal control processes has turned out to be an important contribution to 
corporate governance (Sarens & Beelde, 2006).  
 
H3: Existing and prospective investors will have confidence if the companies’ internal auditors play signif cant role 
in corporate governance than the companies’ internal auditors haven’t.     
 
Investors Protection and Internal Auditors 
To review the previous study we found very little research works have been conducted on this area. This is the 
reason which drives us to explore the area.  Mercer (2004) suggests that internal audit information may be helpful to 
investors in determining the veracity of information provided by a company. Elliott & Jacobson (1994) noted that 
informative disclosures help reduce information risk and are useful to investor decision-making by supplying the 
investor with a better understanding of the company’s overall economic risk. Kinney (2000) notes that this increase 
in reliability is attributable to increased confidenc  in the competence and care applied to measurement methods and 
increased confidence in the trustworthiness of the reported results produced by the auditors’ efforts.  
A study was conducted by Holt (2009) that provided initial evidence that increased internal audit transparency 
provides incremental usefulness to investors beyond current mandated governance disclosures. The findings suggest 
that adding an IAR to existing governance-related rpo ts (e.g., Audit Committee Report, External Audit Report, 
Management Discussion and Analysis) increases investors’ perceived oversight effectiveness and confidece in 
financial reporting reliability. La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries that protect shareholders have more valuable 
stock markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and a higher rate of IPO (initial public offering) activity 
than do the un-protective countries. Countries that pro ect creditors better have larger credit markets. Johnson et al. 
(2000) draw an ingenious connection between investor pr tection and financial crises. In countries with poor 
protection, the insiders might treat outside investors well as long as future prospects are bright andthey are 
interested in continued external financing. When future prospects deteriorate, however, the insiders step up 
expropriation, and the outside investors, whether sareholders or creditors, are unable to do anything about it. As 
(Levine et al 2000, La Porta et al 1998) said all outside investors, be they large or small, creditors or shareholders, 
need rights to get their money back.  
 H4: Protection of existing and prospective investors will mediate if the companies’ board of directors let finance 
and accounts department, internal auditors and external auditors do their job independently to prepare the financial 
statement than the companies’ board of directors don’t.   
METHODOLOGY 
Data & Instrument 
We developed four different survey questionnaires for internal auditors (staffs and head), finance andccounting 
department executives (head and staffs), investors (only individual) and Board of Directors. The questionnaire for 
internal auditors was designed to evaluate their skills, knowledge, and independence and understand of the 
objectivity of the audit functions. A major role is played by the finance and accounting department in preparing the 
financial statements. Therefore, we thought it would be an important criterion to evaluate the objectivity and 
interdependence of finance and accounts departments. Investors are the key members of the whole system. So we 
strongly believed that it is important to know what they think about the work procedure, objectivity and 
independence of internal auditors and finance and accounts departments of the local companies. And what duties the 
board of directors should perform so that all investors will feel protected. Finally, we approached to B ard of 
Directors about their insightfulness regarding the practice of corporate governance (e.g. independence of internal 
audit, preparation of error free financial statements and the protection of individual investors). In the stock market 
probe report, Dr. Ibrahim Khalid mentioned the name of 25 companies, which manipulated the financial st tements 
that was one of important causes of crash of the market (e.g. DSE) in 2010. We selected 100 companies to survey 
that are operating in stock market including those 25 companies. We personally went to these companies, distributed 
the questionnaires and tried to interview the Board of Directors. Regarding the investor survey, we distributed the 
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survey questionnaire to the different brokerage houses in four major cities in Bangladesh. The target number of 
investors was 500 but we ended up with 400 complete questionnaires.  
In the questionnaire, internal audit, the finance and ccounts department and the Board of Directors were asked to 
complete the structured survey questions using a five point Likert scale (Strongly Agree =1, Agree=2, Neutral=3, 
Disagree=4, and Strongly Disagree=5). However, investors were asked to complete the structured survey qu stions 
using a five point Likert scale (Excellent = 4 and N/A = 0). For the convenience of the respondents, we provided 
them a soft copy of the questionnaire so that they could return it through email. We also provided thepr paid 
envelope with the survey questions for the participants’ convenience.  
Design 
We analyzed all the data acquired from the questionnaires by using ANCOVA (2 X 2) that enabled us to test the 
significance of the differences among more than two sample means. Using this analysis of covariance, we were able 
to make inferences about whether our samples are drwn from a population having the same mean. Later, w  used a 
multiple regression and it helped us to use more of the information available to us to estimate the dependent 
variables. Analysis of covariance has been used becaus  sometimes the correlation between two variables maybe 
insufficient to determine a reliable estimating equation.  As we have three independent variables, we may be able to 
determine an estimating equation that describes the relationship with greater accuracy.    
We used mediation to test the H4 that assumed both existing and prospective investors will feel more condolence 
and secured if the companies’ board of directors let finance and accounts department, internal auditors and external 






Where,  Investors Protection,  Independence of Internal Auditors,  Independence of Finance & 
Accounts Department and   Corporate Governance. However, regressions intercept,  residual error.  
 
Finally, we also used a multivariate regression analysis to see how protected the investors are if you c mbine all the 
above mentioned variables such as;  Independence of Internal Auditors,  Independence of Finance & 




Where,  Investors Protection and  regression coefficient and  residual error.  
 
RESULT ANALYSIS 
At first we checked the demographic factors of the participants. All the participants were male for investors, internal 
audit and board of director’s survey. From the investors survey 70% of the investors were trading in DSE for more 
than five years, and considered themselves experienced investors. The rest of them were considered inexperienced. 
In internal audit survey, 65% of the respondents were working more than 5 years as a professional chartered 
accountant. Rests of the 25% have less than 5 yearsof experience but they were also chartered accounts. In finance 
and accounting departments, 10% of the respondents were female, 55% of the total respondents have more than 5 
years of working experience in a related field. However, 70% of the participants have formal accounting or finance 
education. Finally, boards of directors have the avr ge age of 45 and 60% had the professional experience in 
related field of more than 15 years.  
We also conducted the manipulation check of the questionnaire and 90% of the investors found the question  were 
relevant and important in the current scenario of the country. The mean of the survey was 91.80. Internal auditors 
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and finance and accounting departments thought the survey was relevant (mean=92.30, 94.80) respectively. The 
board of directors (mean=92.40) believed that the questions were appropriate to study the current market.     
Hypotheses Test Result 
We used the R i36.15.1 to run the regression and test th  hypotheses. The result of the H1 is presenting below in 
table 1.  
 




Mean Sq F Value Pr(>F) 
IIA 0.09128 0.09128 0.4985 0.5310 
IFA 0.33419 0.33419 1.8251 0.2696 
IIA:IFA 0.48429 0.48429 2.6448 0.2024 
Residuals 0.54932 0.18311   
     Source: from the data analysis in R 
 
The F statistic of the analysis in table 1 is 1.656 and p-value is 0.3443, which clearly indicated that ere is a strong 
and significant relationship which exists between IIA and IIA. And the multiple R2 is 0.6253 and adjusted R2 is 
0.247, so the variables in the regression are positively correlated.   
 




Mean Sq F Value Pr(>F) 
IIA 0.09128 0.09128 0.7770 0.44296 
CG 0.83620 0.83620 7.1180 0.07582 
IIA:CG 0.17917 0.17917 1.5252 0.30474 
Residuals 0.35243 0.11748   
Source: from the data analysis in R 
 
Next, we analyzed the independence of internal audit and corporate governance (H2) and obtained results in table 2. 
We found a strong and positive correlation between IIA and CG, which supported the results of multiple R2 (0.7585) 
and the adjusted R2 (0.5169). And the F statistic of the analysis of table 2 is 3.14, whereas p-value is 0.1862. Here, 
F-statistic is too high and p-value is more than 0.05, so in this case again we say that H2 has been accepted.  We also 
tried to measure the relationship between the independence of finance & accounting departments and corporate 
governance and see whether these can protect the existing and prospective investors. The following table contains 
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Table 3: Analysis of covariance of IFA and CG 
 
 Sum Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(>F) 
IFA 0.3101 0.3101 3.097 0.1766 
CG 0.8140 0.8140 8.128 0.0650 
IFA :CG 0.0343 0.03437 0.3432 0.59915 
Residuals 0.3004 0.10015   
Source: from the data analysis in R 
 
The F statistic value of the analysis is 3.856, whereas the p-value is 0.1484. The result portrays that p-value is more 
than 0.05 and F-statistic value is more than 1. It indicates that the relationship between the independence of finance 
and accounting departments and corporate governance are strongly related and significant. The multiple R2 is 0.7941 
and the adjusted R2 is 0.5882. Therefore, the variables are positively correlated.  Finally, we analyzed the multiple 
regression that has one dependent variable and that is IP (Investors Protection) and three independent variables 
which are: independence of internal auditors (IIA), independence of finance and accounting department (IFA) and 
corporate governance (CG). Table 4 presents the result of the regression analysis.  
 
Table 4: Analysis of covariance of IIA, IFA &CG 
 Sum Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(>F) 
IIA 0.09128 0.09128 0.8288 0.42974 
IFA 0.33419 0.33419 3.0342 0.17989 
CG 0.70319 0.70319 6.3844 0.08567 
Residuals 0.33043 0.11014   
 Source: from the data analysis in R 
 
The F-statistics value of the multiple regression analysis is 3.146 and p-value is 0.17. It indicates hat the 
independent variables are not only strongly but also significantly related to each other. Multiple R2 value of the 
analysis is 0.7735 and adjusted R2 is 0.5471. Thus, independent variables are highly and positively correlated with 
each other.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main focus of the paper is to explore the independence of the internal auditors, competence of the auditors and 
how strong their voice is in the management so that t ey can protect the existing and prospective investors by 
preparing an independent and error free audit report. We also tried to investigate the independence and competence 
of the finance and accounting department of an organization. How truly and error freely they prepare th  financial 
statements for the company. Lastly, we also explored th  board of directors’ attitudes towards the inter al audit 
committee and finance and accounting department while preparing the audit report and financial statements. And 
how cooperative they are in implementing the corporate governance (corporate charter) in their organizations.  
There are four hypotheses which have been used to find out whether existing and prospective investors can be 
protected by the independence of internal auditors, independence finance and accounting departments and corporate 
governance practiced by the board of directors. All the hypotheses have been accepted and independent variables of 
the study are significantly related with each others. And they are positively correlated too. Graphical representations 
of correlation and residuals, leverage, fitted values are provided in the annexure.  
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Apart from the analysis, we put 9 (nine) questions about the qualification, independence, competence ad integrity 
of internal auditors in the investors question survey. We asked the investors to answer the questions in “Yes” or 
“No” format. Surprisingly 65% said that companies do not follow the proper corporate charter and 59% believed 
that companies do not follow the participatory management approach.  On the other hand, 62% strongly believed 
that none of the departments of the organizations can work independently. Among the participants, 70% firmly 
believed that the internal audit committee and the finance and accounts department have been pressurized to 
manipulate the reports/statements. More than 69% feel that internal audit departments should have the necessary 
freedom to prepare an independent audit report. And finally 89% of the respondents strongly believe that if the 
internal auditors and finance and accounting departmen s can work independently and effectively, their investments 
in the organizations will be more protracted.  Graphical representations have been put in the annexure.   
We approached the internal auditors, finance and accounting departments and the board of directors of the 25 
companies that have manipulated their financial statements in 2010 share scam in DSE, mentioned in Dr. Ibrahim 
Khalid probe report. We did not receive any complete questionnaires from these companies. Therefore, the data we 
have gathered may not reflect the true scenario about the investors’ protection in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). 
Future research can be conducted on focusing on the independence of the auditors (internal and external), finance 
and accounting departments and corporate governance pra tice by the board of directors of these 25 companies. It 
could provide more insights about the investors’ protection. And we did not consider the roles, objectiv s and 
independence of external auditors in our study. Prospective researchers can add independence of external auditors as 
independent variables with the existing model and see how external auditors perform to protect the existing and 
protective investors in an economy. 
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Covariance of IP, IIA, IFA and CG 
 IP IIA IFA CG 
IP 0.157550 0.00419000 0.0436500 0.1295900 
IIA 0.004190 0.17731667 -0.0262150 0.03558833 
IFA 0.043650 -0.02621500 0.0989275 0.0041550 
CG 0.129595 0.03538833 0.0041550 0.14313667 
 
Correlation of IP, IIA, IFA and CG 
 IP IIA IFA CG 
IP 1.0000000 0.0250686 0.34963631 0.86298569 
IIA 0.0250686 1.0000000 -0.19793225 0.22213136 
IFA 0.3496363 -0.1979323 1.00000000 0.03491701 
CG 0.8629857 0.2221314 0.03491701 1.00000000 
 
Coefficients between IIA and IFA 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 31.138 19.977 1.559 0.217 
IIA -11.780 7.464 -1.578 0.213 
IFA -12.196 8.000 -1.525 0.225 
IIA:IFA 4.869 2.994 1.626 0.202 
 
Residual standard error: 0.4279, Multiple R-squared: 0.6235, Adjusted R-square: 0.247, F-statistic: 1.656, p-value: 
0.3443 
 






Coefficients between IIA and CG 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 10.235 9.323 1.098 0.353 
IIA -5.262 4.293 -1.226 0.308 
CG -3.328 3.599 -0.925 0.423 
IIA:CG 2.036 1.649 1.235 0.305 
 
Residual standard error: 0.3427, Multiple R-squared: 0.7585, Adjusted R-square: 0.5169, F-statistic: 3.14, p-value: 
0.1862 
Coefficients of IFA and CG 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 9.221 20.088 0.459 0.677 
IFA -3.749 7.439 -0.504 0.649 
CG -3.827 8.303 -0.461 0.676 
IFA:CG 1.801 3.075 0.586 0.599 
 
Residual standard error: 0.3165, Multiple R-squared: 0.7941, Adjusted R-square: 0.5882, F-statistic: 3.856, p-value: 
0.1484 
 
Coefficients of IIA, IF and CG 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -2.65166 1.53108 -1.732 0.1817 
IIA 0.06964 0.34853 0.200 0.8544 
IFA 0.61195 0.45280 1.351 0.2694 
CG 1.00795 0.30891 2.527 0.0857 
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Summary of ANCOVA 
 Intercept IA FA CG 
Intercept 2.3442046 -0.2269919 -0.48788026 -0.22696409 
IIA -0.2269919 0.1214752 0.01689707 -0.04259695 
IFA -0.4878803 0.01689707 0.20502507 -0.02655461 
CG -0.2269641 -0.04259695 -0.02655461 0.15913306 
 
Covariance Graph of IP, IIA, IFA and CG 
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